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Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Investments
Di⁄erently from For-pro￿t Firms? The Case of Social
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Using a longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 504 nonpro￿t and for-pro￿t ￿rms
operating in the social residential sector in Italy, we investigate the relationship
between capital structure and type of enterprise. The nondistribution constraint
typical of nonpro￿t organizations increases the fraction of own capital on total
investment: this is shown, by means of a theoretical moral hazard model, to reduce
their leverage (i). By contrast, the intrinsecally high commitment of nonpro￿t
entrepreneurs weakens the moral hazard problem: this augments leverage (ii). Our
empirical analysis shows that once control for observable characteristics for-pro￿t
companies have a leverage 6% higher than nonpro￿t enterprises, even if the latter
faces lower credit costs. We explain this ￿nding by arguing that e⁄ect (i) prevails
on e⁄ect (ii).
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11 Introduction
Institutional, social and economic rationales suggest that social enterprises might di⁄er
from for-pro￿t ￿rms in terms of capital structure. Indeed, the former trades o⁄ the
typical economic goal of creating wealth, just as any other commercial company, with
the social mandate of promoting the welfare of their members. According to Spreckley
(1978) ￿an enterprise that is owned by those who work in it and perhaps reside in a
given locality, is governed by registered social as well as commercial aims and objectives,
and is run co-operatively may be termed a social enterprise￿ . Dees (2001) believes that
the social mission is explicit and central for social entrepreneurs and that this a⁄ects
how they perceive and assess opportunities: mission-related impact becomes the central
criterion, not wealth creation, which is just a means to an end for social entrepreneurs.
As a consequence, the way social enterprises ￿nance their projects might in principle
be di⁄erent from the one adopted by business entrepreneurs. Indeed, either ￿nancial
institutions may think that social projects are intrinsically less pro￿table, and/or social
enterprises, as it will become clear in the remainder of the introduction, may have
stronger preferences for self ￿nancing. However, to the best of our knowledge there is
scanty evidence about social enterprises versus for-pro￿t ￿rms ￿nancial choices.
The aim of our study is to ￿ll this gap by investigating the relationship between
capital structure and type of enterprise. We use a longitudinal data set of balance
sheets of 500 ￿rms operating in the social residential services sector in Italy. The data
set contains four types of enterprises: on one hand, limited liability and public limited
liability companies, typical for-pro￿t organizations; on the other hand, traditional and
social cooperatives, which exhibit many characteristics of the nonpro￿t institutions.
Legally speaking, traditional cooperatives are nonpro￿t associations par excellence,
recognized in Italy since 1942 (Thomas, 2004). In conducting their activities, they must
adhere to several conditions: for instance, the appropriation of 3% of net annual pro￿t
to a fund for the promotion and development of cooperatives in general. Therefore, the
main aim for cooperatives is not to achieve the highest return on capital investment.
Rather, they try to give members, workers or shareholders an advantage in terms of
good salary, healthy working conditions, ￿ exible timetables, etc.: cooperatives pursue
the so-called mutualistic goal (Mori, 2008).
In addition, social cooperatives (SCs, hereafter) aim at helping the integration of
disadvantaged citizens into society, like elderly persons, physical or mental invalids,
drug addicted, alcoholics, and others at risk of social exclusion. Born spontaneously
in response to the failure of policies for the employment of disadvantaged workers
(Borzaga, 1996), this new entrepreneurial form was recognized and regulated in 1991
through law 381/1991, which introduced four types of SCs: type A, type B, mixed type
A+B and consortia. Type A SCs, which represent 59% of 7,363 Italian SCs according
to 2005 Italian Central Statistical O¢ ce (ISTAT) data, cover caring activities: manage-
ment of social-health care and educational services, provision of home and residential
2care to people at risk, baby-sitting/childminding, cultural activities, and initiatives for
environmental protection. Type B SCs (32.8% of total Italian SCs) are Work Inte-
gration Social Enterprises (WISEs), that is ￿economic entities whose main objective is
the professional integration ￿within the WISE itself or in mainstream enterprises ￿of
people experiencing serious di¢ culties in the labour market￿(Davister, Defourny and
Gregoire, 2004). 4.3% of SCs are of mixed type and provide both caring services and
professional integration. Finally, consortia represent just 3.9% of total population (see
SEL, 2002, and Borzaga and Defourny, 2004, for a survey of the Italian social cooper-
ative system). SCs are given some ￿scal advantage due to their social mission, but the
Italian law imposes a few constraints on their management: a SC cannot distribute any
dividend to their stakeholder or pay salaries higher than the market average to their
workers. Such non-distribution-of-pro￿t constraint also concerns funds collected by a
SC during its whole life and it holds even after a SC stops producing, in which case
assets are transferred to other social and nonpro￿t organizations (Borzaga and Fazzi,
2008).
...To understand the e⁄ect of nonpro￿t status on , it is worth giving a brief expla-
nation of the economic role played by the non-distribution constraint. According to the
trustworthiness theory (Hansmann, 1980, 1996; see also Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001, for
a formal model), nonpro￿t ￿rms appear more trustworthy than for-pro￿t ones for the
non-distribution constraint (i) facilitates donative ￿nancing by assuring donors that
funds will not be appropriated as pro￿ts, and (ii) serves as a signal to consumers that
the ￿rms￿owners have less pecuniary incentives to cheat them through "￿ y-by-night"
strategies of quality reduction.
Valentinov (2008) goes beyond this traditional understanding of the non-distribution
constraint by arguing that it re￿ ects an utility-enhancing character of involvement in
nonpro￿t ￿rms for their key stakeholders. Put di⁄erently, social entrepreneurs are en-
dowed with intrinsic motivations, which are strictly related to their altruism or, more
generally, to their morale.
There are many de￿nitions of morale. Young (1940): ￿morale refers to the zest for
activity, cooperativeness, sense of satisfaction and well-being, loyalty, and courage to
carry on a task￿ . Bateson and Mead (1941): ￿morale is a positive and energetic attitude
toward a goal￿ . Merriam-Webster￿ s Dictionary: ￿the mental and emotional condition
(as of enthusiasm, con￿dence, or loyalty) of an individual or group with regard to the
function or tasks at hand￿ . The common idea among all of these interpretations is that
morale in￿ uences how hard individuals are willing to work. Persons with higher morale
￿nd it less onerous to exert a given level of e⁄ort. Alternatively, having a higher level
of morale decreases the marginal cost of e⁄ort. Stowe (2009) shows that an agent￿ s
e⁄ort level increases with the agent￿ s level of morale, when the latter is observable.
One might thus correctly conclude that moral hazard problems are less severe in SCs,
where entrepreneurs do not maximize private precuniary bene￿ts rather focusing on the
e¢ ciency of both social and economic performance of the activity, than in for-pro￿t
3companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider a
theoretical continuos-investment model ￿ la Tirole (2006), based on a moral hazard
framework. The model enables us to compute a representative ￿rm￿ s optimal leverage,
de￿ned as the amount borrowed over the total investment, and to investigate how such
ratio is a⁄ected by the following four variables: (i) the amount of self-￿nancing, (ii) the
severity of moral hazard problem, (iii) the dimension of Earnings before Interests and
Taxes (EBIT, henceforth) and, ￿nally, (iv) the quantity of nonliquid wealth the ￿rm is
able to put up as collateral. We show that leverage is increasing in both (iii) and (iv),
while decreasing in both (i) and (ii). We argue that the non-distribution constraint
rises the fraction of own capital on total investment for SCs with respect to for-pro￿t
￿rms. As a consequence, the SCs￿demand for credit may be lower. By contrast, the
commitment of the participants to the social cooperative projects is intrinsically high,
reducing the moral hazard problem and augmenting credit available for SCs.
In Section 3 we provide a description of the sample used in the exercise and an
assessment of its coverage and quality. We also compute the average cost of credit
and we ￿nd that it is lower for SCs than for limited companies. Finally, in Section
4 we use panel data econometric techniques to identify the causal relation between
￿nancing strategies and type of enterprise. Our main ￿ndings are consistent with the
theoretical predictions of the model: a higher level of own funds reduces the leverage;
more pro￿table companies rely more on external funds; ￿nally, larger ￿rms have easier
access to the credit markets thanks to their higher ability to put up collateral. We ￿nd
that for-pro￿t companies have a leverage 18% higher than nonpro￿t ones. We show that
composition e⁄ects account for 2/3 of such a di⁄erence. Accordingly to the theoretical
model￿ s predictions, this suggests that SCs, even if not credit rationed, demand less
credit than limited companies.
2 The moral hazard framework
Consider an economy with a ￿rm run by a risk-neutral entrepreneur and numerous
homogeneous risk-neutral lenders.1 At t = 0 the ￿rm needs initial capital I to start up
a business based on two alternative risky productive projects, G and B. Project i 2
fG;Bg returns AI with probability pi and zero otherwise and requires a nontransferable
e⁄ort ei, whose disutility has a monetary equivalent of c(ei)I: A represents the per-
unit-of investment EBIT of both projects G and B, i.e. cash ￿ ow net of setup costs
common to the projects. Let 1 > pG > pB > 0 and let c(eG) = c > 0 = c(eB). The
expected surplus of project G net of I is thus (pGA ￿ c)I; the corresponding value of
project B is pBAI.
Assumption 1 pGA ￿ c > 1 > pBA.
1Throughout the paper we refer to the entrepreneur as "he" and to each lender as "she".
4Assumption 1 states that only project G has a positive expected value, i.e. it is cred-
itworthy.
The ￿rm is endowed with an amount of nonliquid wealth W. Moreover, it owns
limited funds M < I; hence, it has to borrow (I ￿ M) from the lenders, who have
capital but are not skilled to run any productive project. Both lenders and the ￿rm
may alternatively invest (I ￿ M) and M, respectively, in a safe asset returning 1 per
unit invested (i.e. the safe asset is such that p = A = 1). Note that only project G has
a positive expected value, according to lenders￿and ￿rm￿ s outside investment options
and to Assumption 1.
Between t = 0 and t = 1 the entrepreneur chooses between projects G and B, i.e.
he decides whether to exert an e⁄ort in the project at a cost c and improve the success
probability by ￿p or to shirk. This choice is assumed to be nonveri￿able by the lenders,
hence there is moral hazard between the parties.
At t = 1 returns accrue and are split among the parties. Scheme 1 summarizes the
timing.
t = 0 t = 1
j j j
￿nancial contract non-veri￿able claims
and project are settled
investment choice
Scheme 1: Timing of the model
The model is solved backwards: we ￿rst study the ￿rm￿ s choice between projects G
and B and then we derive the t = 0 optimal investment level.
The design of the ￿nancial contract is introduced to study the project choice between
t = 0 and t = 1. In case of success, per-unit-of-investment project return A is divided
in two parts: ￿ 2 [0;A] goes to the ￿rm, while the complement A￿￿ ￿ 0 to the lender.
In case of failure, a collateral C ￿ W put up by the ￿rm is due to the lender. It follows
that the ￿rm￿ s expected gain is (pG￿ ￿ c)I ￿ (1 ￿ pG)C when exerting the e⁄ort and








in which case the ￿rm selects the only creditworthy project G; ￿p ￿ pG ￿ pB is the
marginal impact of e⁄ort on the success probability.
Inequality (1) can be interpreted as the incentive compatibility constraint: the RHS
of (1) increases with e⁄ort cost c, since a higher c shrinks the expected value of project
G thereby heightening the incentive to shirk, whereas it decreases with C because the
collateral acts as a discipline device for the ￿rm.
The ￿rm￿ s problem is to choose I and C in order to maximize its expected pro￿t
U = (pG￿ ￿ c)I ￿ (1 ￿ pG)C ￿ M: (2)
5the ￿rm gains ￿I with probability pG net of the e⁄ort cost cI and loses the collateral C
with complementary probability (1 ￿ pG); M is the opportunity cost of its own funds.
The maximization is subject to three constraints: (i) the collateral value cannot
exceed the level of ￿rm￿ s nonliquid wealth, C ￿ W; (ii) the incentive compatibility
condition (1) has to be satis￿ed, so that the ￿rm selects the only creditworthy project
G; (iii) the lenders must participate, i.e.
V = pG (A ￿ ￿)I + (1 ￿ pG)C ￿ (I ￿ M) ￿ 0; (3)
where pG (A ￿ ￿)I is the lenders￿expected share of the project net of the ￿rm￿ s reward,
(1 ￿ pG)C is the collateral￿ s expected value and (I ￿ M) is the opportunity cost of the
loan.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal level of investment is
I￿ = k(M + W); (4)
where k = [1 ￿ pG (A ￿ c=￿p)]
￿1 > 1.
Formal proofs of this and next results are in the Appendix.






In Proposition 1 we provide some comparative statics on the optimal leverage L￿ =
k(M+W)￿M
k(M+W) .
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the ￿rm￿ s optimal leverage L￿ (i) de-
creases with the amount of own funds M and the e⁄ort disutility c and (ii) increases
with the level of EBIT A and the value of collateral W.
Higher EBIT A augments the credit-constrained ￿rm￿ s leverage because the in-
vestment becomes more appealing for both lenders and the ￿rm.2 In addition, higher
internal ￿nance M reduces the leverage as the demand for credit shrinks.3
Finally, the lenders￿expected pro￿t and, as a consequence, the amount of credit
available for the ￿rm, is negatively a⁄ected by the moral hazard problem. Such a
problem, in turn, intensi￿es as c increases because shirking becomes more attractive
for the ￿rm, but it softens as W enlarges because shirking becomes less attractive.
2More precisely, higher A makes the lenders￿participation constraint less binding and, as a conse-
quence, there is more credit available for the ￿rm.
3This holds as long as the ￿rm has a positive nonliquid wealth to be put up as a collateral. Indeed,
one can check that the level of M does not a⁄ect optimal leverage L
￿ if C = 0.
63 The data
The theoretical model proposed in the previous section provides predictions about the
relationship between the indebtedness level of the ￿rm L￿ and (i) the level of own funds
M, (ii) the e⁄ort cost c, (iii) the per-unit-of-investment amount of cash ￿ ow A and (iv)
the value of the potential collateral W.
Any analysis aiming at testing the empirical validity of such a theory should there-
fore rely on a dataset providing a reasonable measure of these variables for a represen-
tative sample of companies. In this paper we exploit information available in the AIDA
database. AIDA is the Italian component of the European Amadeus database, distrib-
uted by Bureau van Dijk, which is used in most of the empirical analysis on the capital
structure of European ￿rms (see, e.g., Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme, 2008). The
AIDA version we have access to provides accounts, ratios and activities for the largest
200,000 Italian companies from 1998 to 2007 and ownership information for the top
20,000 companies for year 2007. We consider ￿rms whose activity are described by the
ATECO codes corresponding to the residential social services.4 Thus we consider ￿rms
operating nursing homes for elderly, disabled, patients with psychiatric disorders or
drug addicted. We are able to ￿nd 504 active companies with 2007 balance sheet data
satisfying the previous criteria. Among them, 278 are share companies (259 limited
liabilities companies), and the remaining 226 are cooperatives (215 SCs): we consider
the ￿rst as our sample of for-pro￿t companies (Limited companies), and the full set of
cooperatives as non-pro￿t (SCs).
Companies are remarkably heterogeneous with respect to their size both between
and within the two types of ￿rms we consider. In Figure 1 we depict the distribution
of the (logarithm) of the total assets and total revenue by company type. The median
limited liabilities company has 1.9 million Euro of total assets in 2007 (corresponding
to a 7.55 in the graph), 39% more than the median social cooperative. As the graph
shows, big not-for-pro￿t companies (above 3 million Euro of total assets) are rare. The
right graph of Figure 1 shows that SCs are smaller than limited companies also in
terms of total revenue (with a median of 1.6 vs 1.85 million Euro).
Companies look somewhat more homogeneous if we consider some fundamental
indexes which play a crucial role in our empirical analysis. Let us ￿rst de￿ne the
leverage as the ratio between total debt and total assets. We consider such a variable as
a proxy of the theoretical L￿ = (I￿ ￿ M)=I￿. In other words, in our empirical analysis
we consider I to be the stock of assets (either tangibles or not) used by the company to
supply its services. The Return on Assets (ROA) index is de￿ned as the ratio between
EBIT and total assets; we thus refer to it as a proxy of the expected return of one unit of
investment pGA￿c￿1: given the probability of success pG, a higher ROA corresponds
4In a previous version of the paper (see http://www.euricse.eu/sites/default/￿les/Fedele.pdf) we
used also data for companies operating in the health and social non residential services. Here we focus
on the residencial social services because only in this sector we have a number of both pro￿t and non
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Social coop Limited liabilities
log(Total revenue)
Figure 1: Distribution of the (logarithm) of total assets and total revenue by company
type. Year 2007, original data in thousand of Euro.
Social cooperatives Limited companies
Leverage 58.54 69.35
ROA 4.87 7.96
Tangible=Total Assets 20.87 36.00
Labor cost/Total revenue 49.10 28.68
Std. err. ROA 9.36 17.86
Financial burden/Total debt 2.07 2.83
Table 1: Ratios by company type. If not otherwise speci￿ed, averages over the 2001-
2007 period. Percentage points.
to a higher EBIT A and/or to a lower e⁄ort cost c. Therefore we may expect a positive
correlation between leverage and ROA. Notice that this prediction, although supported
by the theoretical model illustrated in the previous section, is in contrast with much of
the empirical literature on capital structure. Finally, the Tangible Assets/Total Assets
ratio is, given the dimension of the company, a proxy of the amount of collateral the
company can provide to the lender and, according to the theoretical ￿ndings, positively
correlated with the leverage.
Table 1 shows that on average the limited companies have the highest leverage
together with the highest tangible to total assets ratio and the highest ROA. This
prima facie evidence is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
The theoretical model cannot explain all the observed di⁄erence in the leverage
between the two types of companies, other factors can be conducive to determine the
8￿nancing strategies. First of all, although we consider ￿rms operating all in the same
sector, their activities may di⁄er substantially, with di⁄erences which are not directly
observable but might be re￿ ected by the incidence of the labour cost on the revenues.
We thus consider the Labor costs/Total Revenues ratio as a useful index to describe
these structural di⁄erences, and in Table 1 we show that this ratio is remarkably higher
for the SCs than for the for-pro￿t companies. These statistics suggest that despite
all the ￿rms operate in the same sector, they supply heterogeneous services, with SCs
specializing in labour intensive ones.
The decision to resort to the credit market is also related to the risk aversion of the
entrepreneurs, which, again, are not directly observable. A risk averse agent is ready
to accept a lower expected return of the investment in order to reduce its volatility.
We can therefore compare the mean and the standard error of ROA for the two types
of companies to gain some insight about their risk attitude. Table 1 shows that both
the mean and the standard error of ROA are lower for the SCs, which suggests that
nonpro￿t ￿rms are less risk tolerant than for-pro￿t companies.
Finally, if we consider the ￿nancial burden/total debt as a proxy of the credit cost,
we see that SCs have on average a ￿nancial burden lighter than the limited liability
companies￿one, that is credit is likely to be less costly for social enterprises.
4 Regression analysis
In this section we run a multivariate analysis by estimating a random e⁄ects model for
longitudinal data (Wooldridge 2001). This will give further insights on the e⁄ects of
the variables considered in the theoretical model over the actual choices of the leverage
operated by the companies. We have balance sheet information going from 2002 to




it￿1￿ + Tt￿ + ￿i + uit; (5)
where Li is dummy variable which equals 1 for the limited companies, xit includes total
assets (in logs), the ratio of tangible to total assets, the incidence of the labor costs on
total revenue, the ROA and a proxy of the Mt￿1=It￿1 ratio given by (1 ￿ leverageit￿1).
Tt identi￿es a full set of time dummies in order to take into account business cycle
e⁄ects, ￿i is the unobservable time invariant individual e⁄ect and uit is the idiosyncratic
error term. Given the nature of the covariates we consider, neither the ordinary least
squares (OLS) nor the generalized least squares (GLS) provide consistent estimates
of the parameters of interest. In fact, the past values of the balance sheet items are
correlated with the unobservable time invariant characteristics of the ￿rms ￿i, and
are potentially correlated with past idiosyncratic shocks uit. We thus resort to GMM
estimates following Blundell and Bond (2000). We used xt lagged at least twice as
instrument for the ￿rst di⁄erenced equation; the di⁄erenced covariates (xt￿1 ￿ xt￿2),
the time and the company type dummies for the level equation. The Sargan test of
9Coe⁄. Std. Err. z P > jzj
Limited companies 0.056 0.016 3.37 0.001
Ln(Total Assets)t￿1 0.030 0.016 1.88 0.060
Tangible/Total Assetst￿1 0.071 0.061 1.16 0.245
ROAt￿1 0.201 0.048 4.23 0.000
Own funds/Total Assetst￿1 -1.118 0.056 -19.97 0.000
Labor cost/Total revenuet￿1 0.048 0.035 1.34 0.179
Table 2: GMM estimates of equation (5). Dependent variable: Ln(leverageit). The
speci￿cation includes also year dummies.
overidentifying restriction and the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in ￿rst-
di⁄erenced errors never reject the hypothesis of correct speci￿cation.
Our estimates (see Table 2) show a positive and statistically signi￿cant relation
between the ROA and the leverage. Although the parameter is precisely estimated,
the economic relevance of this relation is limited: one percentage point more of ROA
is associated with an increase of 0.2% of the leverage, which at the average leverage
level of 61.8% correspond to 0.12 percentage points. The elasticity of leverage to total
assets (@ lnleveraget=@ lnTotalAssetst￿1) is estimated to be 0.03, while the estimated
parameter for the tangible to total assets ratio is not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
This result suggests that once controlled for the size of the ￿rm, the access to the credit
market is not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the nature (tangible vs intangible) of the ￿rms￿
assets, and that the total amount of assets captures the company ability to put up
a collateral. Unsurprisingly, the proxy for the (M=I)t￿1 ratio plays a crucial role: a
Own funds/Total Assets ratio one percentage point higher determines a 1.12% drop
in the leverage of the following year, which corresponds on average to a decrease of
0.7 percentage points. The incidence of labor costs on total revenue does not seem
to signi￿cantly a⁄ect the indebtedness of the company. Finally, for-pro￿t companies
have a leverage 5.6% higher than SCs. On average, limited companies￿leverage is 18%
higher than SCs￿one (69.35% vs 58.54%, see Table 1), our results show that about 2/3
of this di⁄erence is due to composition e⁄ects, that is to observable di⁄erences in size,
incidence of labor cost and past capital structure that we are able to control for with
a multivariate analysis.
Why the limited companies have a capital structure di⁄erent from SCs even after
controlling for these factors? We conjecture that this is the result of countervailing
forces at work. On one side, the non-distribution constraint may decrease the optimal
leverage for SCs over and above the e⁄ect captured by the Own funds/Total Assets
variable. Furthermore, in the previous section we provided evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that SCs are characterized by lower risk tolerance, and this might shrink
their demand for external funds. On the other side, the commitment of the participants
to the social cooperative projects is intrinsically high: this lowers e⁄ort cost c, thereby
augmenting the incentive to run the project properly. The e⁄ect on equilibrium credit
10available to SCs is positive. Indeed, lower c makes the ￿rm￿ s incentive compatibility
constraint less binding; this, in turn, makes the lenders￿participation constraint less
binding; since the lenders compete to grant the loan, the ￿rm ends up by having more
credit available. According to our empirical ￿ndings the former e⁄ects outdo the latter,
even if social enterprises have cheaper access to credit, as documented in Table 1.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure and type of enter-
prise. We study the behavior of about 500 nonpro￿t and for-pro￿t ￿rms operating
in the residential social services sector in Italy in 2002-2007, and we ￿nd that limited
companies have a leverage 18% higher than SCs (69.35% vs 58.54%). We show that
2/3 of such a di⁄erence is due to observable heterogeneity in size, incidence of labor
cost and past capital structure. Our estimates are consistent with the predictions of
the theoretical model: the more pro￿table the ￿rms are and/or the larger the amount
of assets which can be put up as collateral the higher is the leverage; the higher is the
amount of own funds (either by choice or by legal constraint) the lower is the resort to
the credit markets. The multivariate analysis leaves an unexplained 5.6% di⁄erence in
the leverage of the two types of companies. This result is illustrated as follows. On one
hand, the intrinsically high commitment of nonpro￿t entrepreneurs weakens the moral
hazard problem: this is shown to increase credit available for them. By contrast, the
nondistribution constraint typical of nonpro￿t organizations and their superior risk-
aversion increases the fraction of own capital on total investment: this is shown to
a⁄ect negatively the demand for credit and, according to the empirical result, to outdo
the ￿rst e⁄ect.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The lenders are supposed to compete ￿ la Bertrand on ￿, with the e⁄ect
that the creditor who grants the loan must have a binding participation constraint: V = 0.
To prove this claim, notice that if the equilibrium contract provided the lenders with positive
pro￿ts, then at least one of them would be able to pro￿tably deviate by slightly augmenting ￿
and granting the loan with probability 1. If
pG (A ￿ ￿) ￿ 1; (6)
then equality V = 0 admits the following ￿nite solution5
I =
(1 ￿ pG)C + M
1 ￿ pG (A ￿ ￿)
: (7)
5Condition (6) states that the lender￿ s expected pro￿ts would be negative if she funded the
whole investment, i.e. M = 0, and the ￿rm had no collateral, i.e. C = 0.
11The di⁄erence between I and M can be interpreted as the lender￿ s supply of credit:
I ￿ M =
(1 ￿ pG)C + [pG (A ￿ ￿)]M
1 ￿ pG (A ￿ ￿)
:
In Figure A1 we represent the above value as a function of pG (A ￿ ￿), the lender￿ s expected
remuneration, and for di⁄erent C.
Figure A1 Credit supply
The supply of credit increases both with (A ￿ ￿) and C, the lenders￿return in case of the ￿rm￿ s
success and failure, respectively. Solving V = 0 by ￿ and substituting the result obtained in
(2) we get (pGA ￿ c ￿ 1)I. This means that the ￿rm￿ s objective function is increasing in I
(and in I ￿ M as well), hence C is set as high as possible and I such that ￿ is as low as






i.e. the collateral must equal the nonliquid ￿rm￿ s wealth and the incentive compatibility con-
dition (1) must be binding. Substituting (8) in (7) we get the result in the text, which is also
displayed in the above ￿gure, where ￿￿ = c
￿p ￿ W












which can be rewritten as c > c ￿ ￿p(pGA ￿ 1)=pG > 0. We suppose the last inequality
holds true, hence solution (4) is acceptable. This hypothesis puts a lower bound to the value
of the e⁄ort disutility, but it is compatible with Assumption 1.
















k2 (M + W)
k0 (c) < 0















k2 (M + W)
k0 (A) > 0













k2 (M + W)
2 > 0
because both k and M are strictly positive.
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